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INTRODUCTION

3D printing is an emerging technology that is moving fast
from the workshop into the home. No longer are the rapid
prototyping and additive manufacturing capabilities of 3D
printers reserved for engineers and researchers. Today
consumers, hobbyists, and technophiles can download a
computer-aided design or CAD file (a digital representation of
a physical product) and additively “print” a three-dimensional
product or component as simply as one can print words to a
page. 1 In 2012, these digital printable items were coined as
“physibles” by the notorious online piracy website The Pirate
Bay. 2
This technology has wide-ranging and profound effects on
intellectual property rights, particularly patents. Centuries of
traditional manufacturing processes and commercial
infrastructure have shaped patent law under the assumption
that physical goods are traded in physical form. For example,
a factory infringes a patent by “making” the patented product,
a retailer infringes a patent by “selling” the patented product,
and a purchaser of a product infringes a patent by “using” the
patented product. 3 Because these various acts each constitute
direct infringement, patent owners are generally able to
enforce their patents against different entities to extinguish
any harmful infringement at the source.
Sometimes it can be difficult or impractical to target a
direct infringer and extinguish infringement. Suppose a
patented machine is only partially assembled (and thus
noninfringing) 4 but is sold across the country to individuals
1. For an overview of 3D printing technology, see Daniel H. Brean, Asserting
Patents to Combat Infringement Via 3D Printing: It’s No “Use,” 23 FORDHAM
INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 771 *2013).
2. Evolution: New Category, The Pirate Bay (January 23, 2012),
http://thepiratebay.org/blog/203 (“We believe that the next step in copying will be
made from digital form into physical form. It will be physical objects. Or as we
decided to call them: Physibles. Data objects that are able (and feasible) to become
physical. We believe that things like three dimensional printers, scanners, and
such are just the first step.”).
3. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (“[W]hoever without authority makes, uses, offers to
sell, or sells any patented invention, within the United States or imports into the
United States any patented invention during the term of the patent therefor,
infringes the patent.”).
4. Becton Dickinson & Co. v. C.R. Bard, Inc., 922 F.2d 792, 796 (Fed. Cir.
1990) (“To establish infringement of a patent, every limitation set forth in a claim
must be found in an accused product or process exactly or by a substantial
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who later assemble the entire machine (and thus infringe).5
One could sue each individual customer for “making” or “using”
the device, 6 but it is obviously more efficient and effective to
somehow stop the manufacture of the partially-assembled
components before they are distributed. Situations like this
gave rise to indirect infringement claims—causes of action
based on providing a component of a patented product or
actively encouraging others to infringe. 7 As the Supreme
Court has explained, these indirect infringement doctrines
essentially “provide for the protection of patent rights where
enforcement against direct infringers is impracticable.” 8
There is a considerable drawback to having to rely on
indirect theories of infringement, however.
“Direct
infringement has long been understood to require no more than
the unauthorized use of a patented invention” by performing
one of the enumerated activities under Section 271(a). 9 In
other words, direct infringement is a strict liability tort.
Indirect infringement, by contrast, requires proof of a culpable
intent—namely, the intent to cause infringement, which
includes both knowledge of the patent and knowledge that the
third party direct infringer’s conduct was, in fact, infringing. 10
In practice, this is quite hard to prove, and is generally proven
only with circumstantial evidence. For these reasons, patent
owners almost universally prefer not to rely on indirect
equivalent.”).
5. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (providing that “making” an invention constitutes
infringement);Bauer & Cie v. O’Donnell, 229 U.S. 1, 10 (1913) (“The right to make
can scarcely be made plainer by definition, and embraces the construction of the
thing invented.”).
6. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (“[W]hoever without authority makes, uses, offers to
sell, or sells any patented invention, within the United States or imports into the
United States any patented invention during the term of the patent therefor,
infringes the patent.”).
7. 35 U.S.C. § 271(b) (“Whoever actively induces infringement of a patent
shall be liable as an infringer.”); 35 U.S.C. § 271(c) (“Whoever offers to sell or sells
within the United States or imports into the United States a component of a
patented machine . . . constituting a material part of the invention, knowing the
same to be especially made or especially adapted for use in an infringement of
such patent . . . shall be liable as a contributory infringer.”).
8. Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 377 U.S. 476, 511
(1964) (quoting H.R. 5988, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. (1948); H.R. 3866, 81st Cong., 1st
Sess. (1949))
9. Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 131 S. Ct. 2060, 2065 n.2
(2011).
10. Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 131 S. Ct. 2060, 2068 (2011);
Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 377 U.S. 476, 488 (1964).
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infringement theories unless obtaining relief for direct
infringement is impracticable.
Between direct and indirect infringement, patent law
attempts to promote efficiency in enforcement by minimizing
the number of parties that must be sued to obtain meaningful
relief. This reflects sound policy that avoids waste of private
and public resources. And, of course, the exclusive right of a
patent is of little value without a meaningful remedy for
infringement.
In a world of in-home 3D printing, it is the printer of the
3D product, not the provider or seller of the digital file from
which the product is printed, who is directly infringing any
patents directed to the product. Specifically, the person who
downloads a CAD file and prints a product on a home 3D
printer is the person “making” the product for purposes of
direct infringement. 11 The maker or seller of the CAD file, by
contrast, is not making anything physical, nor are they using, 12
selling, 13 or offering to sell 14 the patented physical product.
Thus, they are not direct infringers under Section 271(a).
The fact that the customers are the manufacturers in this
scenario reveals how fundamentally in-home 3D printing
departs from longstanding commercial traditions. In turn, the
fact that source of the infringement—the effective provider of
the entire patented invention—cannot be targeted as a direct
infringer reveals that the law has not yet caught up to the
technological reality that physical goods can now be bought
and sold digitally. 15
In theory, indirect infringement claims might still be able
11. While Section 271 does not define “make” or “making,” the Supreme
Court has stated that “[t]he right to make can scarcely be made plainer by
definition, and embraces the construction of the thing invented.” Bauer & Cie v.
O’Donnell, 229 U.S. 1, 10 (1913).
12. “The ordinary meaning of ‘use’ is to ‘put into action or service.’ ” NTP,
Inc. v. Research in Motion, Ltd., 418 F.3d 1282, 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
13. “[I]n order for there to have been a sale . . . the entire apparatus must
have been constructed and ready for use.” Ecodyne Corp. v. Croll-Reynolds Eng’g
Co., 491 F. Supp. 194, 197 (D. Conn. 1979); accord Lang v. Pacific Marine &
Supply Co., 895 F.2d 761, 765 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
14. “[An] offer [to sell] must be for a potentially infringing article,” i.e., a
tangible object. Transocean Offshore Deepwater Drilling, Inc. v. Maersk
Contractors, 617 F.3d 1296, 1309 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
15. For a more detailed discussion of why the provider of a CAD file is not
directly infringing a product patent under 35 U.S.C. §271(a), see Brean, supra
note 1, at 783-803.
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to reach the makers and sellers of CAD files. But contributory
infringement, which requires that the item being accused be a
“component” of the infringing product, 16 is not viable because
CAD files are akin to software in the abstract, which the
Supreme Court recently held cannot be considered a
“component” of a computer. 17 Like software, a CAD file”might
be compared to a blueprint (or anything containing design
information, [e.g., a schematic, template, or prototype]),” but is
not itself a “component” combinable into a device. 18 This leaves
only active inducement of infringement, which, while
technically viable, is undesirable because it still has the
considerable hurdle of proving the requisite scienter discussed
above. 19
What remains is a gap in patent law that should be filled
with a way that digital printable products may be patented per
Anything less would go against the recognized
se. 20
“adaptability of the patent system to new technologies.” 21 Now
that physical goods can be and are designed, developed,
bought, and sold in digital form, it would disincentivize
16. 35 U.S.C. § 271(c).
17. Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 550 U.S. 437, 449-50 (2007).
18. Id.
19. Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 131 S. Ct. 2060, 2068 (2011).
20. See Brean, supra note 1, at 804 (“This state of the law leaves patentees
virtually helpless to combat a large class of infringement of their product claims.
If patent law is to continue to encourage innovation, however, Congress or the
courts must eventually close this gap.”). Professors Timothy Holbrook and Lucas
Osborn take a different view, arguing that existing law can close this gap to a
large degree. Digital Patent Infringement in an Era of 3D Printing, 48 UC DAVIS
L. REV. 1319 (2015). However, the approach taken by Holbrook and Osborn is
largely policy driven, and parses the various acts of direct infringement under
Section 271(a) such that some, but not all, would be able to reach CAD files.
Specifically, they suggest that a “sale” of or “offer[] to sell” a CAD file should be
actionable because such acts appropriate the “economic value” of the patented
invention. Id. at 1356-57. But they conclude that “making” a CAD file should not
be actionable because it has a less direct economic effect on the patent owner, and
can lead to undesirable liability for incidental infringers. Id. at 1385. Such an
approach, while very persuasively presented, lacks any statutory support for
distinguishing whether a CAD file per se may be protected based on the act
accused of infringing, and would likely require an act of Congress to be
implemented.
21. In re Schrader, 22 F.3d 290, 297 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (Newman, J., dissenting)
(“The nation has benefitted from the adaptability of the patent system to new
technologies, as was recognized in Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 316,
206 USPQ 193, 200, 65 L. Ed. 2d 144, 100 S. Ct. 2204 (1980) (“Mr. Justice Douglas
reminded that the inventions most benefiting mankind are those which ‘push
back the frontiers of chemistry, physics and the like.’ ” )”).
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designers and developers of 3D-printable products from
innovating in their spaces if they were placed at a legal
disadvantage from their more traditional manufacturing
counterparts. The patent system must, equally for all kinds of
innovators, “promote the Progress of Science and useful
Arts.” 22
Part I of this Article examines whether Beauregard
claims, which are a well-settled form of patent protection for
digitally stored instructions, can provide adequate protection
for 3D printable objects. Although the use of Beauregard
claims is found to be permissible for covering instructions for
printing 3D objects, the legal and technological limitations of
using Beauregard claims to protect CAD files suggests that the
improved enforceability of patent rights under this approach is
marginal. Part II of this Article explores the feasibility of
creating a new Beauregard-like claim format to protect CAD
files per se.
I.

CAN BEAUREGARD CLAIMS PROTECT PHYSIBLES?

This Part provides an overview of Beauregard claims and
questions whether such a claiming format can provide
additional patent protection for 3D-printable objects that will
adequately bridge the current gap in patent rights for such
inventions.
Although the short answer is that, yes,
Beauregard claims can in theory be used to gain broader patent
scope, the enhanced scope is modest.
A. An Overview of Beauregard Claims
In In re Beauregard, the patent applicant drafted claims
directed to a tangible storage medium (e.g., a floppy disk)
having a computer program stored on the medium. 23 The
Patent Office rejected the claims based on the printed matter
doctrine, 24 which prohibits patenting printed material where
there is no “new and unobvious functional relationship
between the printed matter [i.e., the software code] and the
substrate [i.e., the disk].” 25 While the applicant’s appeal was
pending, the Patent Office changed its position and held that
22.
23.
24.
25.

U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
In re Beauregard, 53 F.3d 1583, 1584 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
Id. at 1584.
In re Gulack, 703 F.2d 1381, 1386 (Fed. Cir. 1983).

2015]

3D PRINTING & PATENTING PHYSIBLES

843

“computer programs embodied in a tangible medium, such as
floppy diskettes, are patentable subject matter under 35 U.S.C.
§ 101 and must be examined under 35 U.S.C. §§ 102 and 103.”26
Because there was no longer a case or controversy, the appeal
was dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 27
Following Beauregard, even though the Federal Circuit
did not affirmatively endorse the Patent Office’s shift in policy,
so-called Beauregard claims were widely adopted by patent
practitioners and remain acceptable for use in patents. As
some commentators explained,
[s]uch claims take the general form: “a computer usable
medium having computer readable code” or “a computer
readable medium storing a computer program.” The
distinguishing feature of this type of claim is that it is for an
algorithm (the “program code”) fixed in a well-known tangible
form (the “computer usable medium”). Yet the novelty usually
lies in the code, not the medium. Large numbers of patent
claims have been issued in this form, and many more such
patent applications are pending. 28
Notably, in Beauregard there was apparently nothing
preventing the applicant from seeking protection on the
software method itself. But, as Donald Chisum observes, the
purpose of seeking distinct protection on the software storage
medium “seemed to be to convert a potential claim
for indirect infringement of the method claim (active
inducement of infringement by others through instruction)
into an easier to prove claim for direct infringement (sales of a
patented medium or ‘kit’ with the instructions).” 29 Patenting
the method would make the user of the software the direct
infringer, but patenting a disk containing the software 30 would
make the seller of the software the direct infringer. 31
The Beauregard application was owned by IBM, a key
26. Beauregard, 53 F.3d at 1584.
27. Id.
28. Andrei Iancu & Jeremiah Helm, Code on Disks and Hat Tricks—Is
Computer Software on a Medium Really Patentable?, 90 J. Pat. & Trademark Off.
Soc’y 97, 99 (2008).
29. 1 Donald S. Chisum, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 1.02[4][d] (2014).
30. When Beauregard was decided in 1995, nearly all software was sold on
disks because broadband Internet was not yet widely available to consumers to
download large software files.
31. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (proscribing that use and sale of a patented method or
object, respectively, constitutes direct infringement).
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player in the electronics and software industry, and was known
to be a “test case.” 32 “In Beauregard, IBM sought to bring
before the Federal Circuit its idea that algorithms (or software
inventions, if you prefer) should be claimable in essentially this
format.” 33 The rule of law that IBM sought and the USPTO
ultimately adopted 34 was plainly driven by the idea that, from
a policy standpoint, software on disk should be patentable
because otherwise there was no good way to protect against
unauthorized distribution of software per se. 35 As IBM argued,
“[t]he claim to the floppy disk was needed to facilitate patent
infringement suits against contributory infringers and
inducers of infringement of the allowed apparatus and process
claims. There was no devious purpose to reach anything wider
or to obtain a broader monopoly than the legitimate monopoly
of the apparatus and process claims.” 36
Facially, because 3D-printable objects are made by
instructing a 3D printer, there is no reason that such
instructions could not be protected by Beauregard-style claims,
for example:
A computer readable medium storing computer readable
instructions which, when acted upon by a 3D printer, cause the
3D printer to print a widget comprising:
element A;
element B; and
element C disposed between elements A and B.
This form of claiming, because it does not claim the
method of printing per se but the storage medium containing
the printing instructions, avoids some of the enforceability
issues noted above. Although one could presumably draft
acceptable claims of this fashion, the following sub-parts
address important legal and technological limitations on the
efficacy of such an approach.

32. Richard H. Stern, An Attempt to Rationalize Floppy Disk Claims, 17 J.
Marshall J. Computer & Info. L. 183, 195 (1998).
33. Id. (emphasis added).
34. Inacu & Helm, supra note 28, at 99; see also Manual of Patent Examining
Procedure, at § 211.05 III (9th ed. 2014) (describing ability to claim invention as
“a computer-readable medium containing certain programming”)
35. Stern, supra note 32, at 195.
36. Id at n. 64.
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B. Legal Limitations of Using Beauregard Claims for 3DPrintable Files
An important limitation on Beauregard claims is the fact
that the mere recitation of a “computer readable medium” will
not automatically avoid a challenge that the claimed invention
is too abstract to constitute patent-eligible subject matter
under 35 U.S.C. § 101. 37 This is because “[r]egardless of what
statutory category (‘process, machine, manufacture, or
composition of matter,’ 35 U.S.C. § 101) a claim’s language is
crafted to literally invoke, we look to the underlying invention
for patent-eligibility purposes.” 38
Beauregard claims involving computer-implemented
business methods, methods of processing data, etc. are
increasingly scrutinized for abstractness in the wake of recent
Supreme Court precedent expounding upon the abstractness
doctrine. 39
To this author’s knowledge, no successful
abstractness challenge has ever been made to a method of
manufacturing a particular product. Indeed, such a challenge
would surely fail because a manner of constructing a
specifically-claimed object is undoubtedly limited to a narrow
physical application of manufacturing abstractions. 40
The more pronounced limitations of Beauregard claims
(for purposes of this Article) arise from the fact that the
claimed subject matter is confined to a tangible storage
medium. Only certain actions constitute direct infringement
37. Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2353–54 (2014)
(explaining that abstract ideas are not eligible for patent protection).
38. CyberSource Corp. v. Retail Decisions, Inc., 654 F.3d 1366, 1374 (Fed.
Cir. 2011); see also Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2360 (holding system claims patentineligible just like method claims because “the system claims are no different
from the method claims in substance. The method claims recite the abstract idea
implemented on a generic computer; the system claims recite a handful of generic
computer components configured to implement the same idea. This Court has
long ‘warn[ed] . . . against’ interpreting § 101 in ways that make patent eligibility
‘depend simply on the draftsman’s art.’”) (citations and internal quotation marks
omitted).
39. See, e.g., CyberSource, 654 F.3d at 1375 (deeming Beauregard claim
ineligible and discussing Bilski v. Doll, 129 S. Ct. 2735 (2009)); Alice, 134 S. Ct.
at 2360 (holding that “[p]etitioner’s claims to a computer system and a computerreadable medium fail for substantially the same reasons. Petitioner conceded
below that its media claims rise or fall with its method claims.”)
40. See, e.g., Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 184 (1981) (deeming “process
for molding precision synthetic rubber products” patent eligible, and explaining
that “[i]ndustrial processes such as this are the types which have historically been
eligible to receive the protection of our patent laws”).
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of such claims. Unlike dealing in actual physical disks,
“selling” or “offering to sell” a CAD file that a user downloads
onto his or her own computers is not providing the user with
any “storage medium.” Arguably, the CAD file provider is not
“using” the data on the storage medium because the provider
is only passively permitting access to the data, not “put[ting]
[it] into service.” 41 At most, the CAD file distributor has
“made” the claimed invention because the act of storing the
digital file on the server created the claimed storage medium
with the claimed data on it. 42 This act of infringement is
enough to potentially warrant an injunction, but injunctions
are far more difficult to obtain today than they used to be.43
And because the CAD file need only be placed onto a server
once to be downloaded countless times, the damages for this
single infringing act of “making” may not be adequate to
compensate for the resulting infringement. Thus, even if a
Beauregard-style claim is permitted for CAD files, the practical
effect of enhancing enforceability is modest.
A claim that is not restricted to a physical storage medium
might avoid these enforceability issues, but would run into
different abstractness problems. As the Federal Circuit
recently emphasized in Digitech Image Technologies., LLC v.
Electronics for Imaging, Inc., “[d]ata in its ethereal, nonphysical form is simply information that does not fall under
any of the categories of eligible subject matter under section
101.” 44 While that case involved pure data that did not, and
was not intended to, represent a precise 3D physical product,
41. NTP, Inc. v. Research in Motion, Ltd., 418 F.3d 1282, 1316–17 (Fed. Cir.
2005).
42. “The right to make can scarcely be made plainer by definition, and
embraces the construction of the thing invented.” Bauer & Cie v. O’Donnell, 229
U.S. 1, 10 (1913).
43. eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC, 547 U.S. 388, 391–394 (2006)
(rejecting presumption that injunctive relief is appropriate upon a finding of
infringement, and holding that “the decision whether to grant or deny injunctive
relief . . . must be exercised consistent with traditional principles of equity,” which
includes consideration of whether the plaintiff “has suffered an irreparable
injury” and whether “remedies available at law . . . are inadequate to compensate
for that injury”); see also Daniel Harris Brean, Will the ‘Nexus’ Requirement of
Apple v. Samsung Preclude Injunctive Relief in the Majority of Patent Cases?, 51
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 153 (2014) (demonstrating that the Federal Circuit’s posteBay “nexus” requirement created a substantial new hurdle to injunctive relief
in cases involving complex or multi-component products).
44. Digitech Image Techs., LLC v. Electronics for Imaging, Inc., 758 F.3d
1344, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
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it nonetheless presents a substantial hurdle to patenting
digital products per se. 45
C. Technological Limitations of Using Beauregard Claims
for 3D-Printable Files
Designers work in CAD programs to create CAD files, and
those CAD files can themselves be used to print objects. 46
Thus, unsurprisingly, the commerce surrounding 3D-printable
objects appears to be done via CAD files. 47
Instructing a 3D printer to print an object is not quite as
simple as inputting a CAD file into the printer, however—
there is an important intermediate step where the CAD file is
converted into a format that the printer can understand and
use. The following explanation from 3DPrinting.com provides
a helpful summary of the process of “slicing” the CAD file into
many two-dimensional images reflecting the additive printing
sequence:
How does 3D Printing work?
It all starts with making a virtual design of the object you
want to create. This virtual design is made in a
CAD (Computer Aided Design) file using a 3D modeling
program (for the creation of a totally new object) or with the
use of a 3D scanner (to copy an existing object). A 3D
scanner makes a 3D digital copy of an object.
To prepare a digital file [created in a 3D modeling
program] for printing, the 3D modeling software “slices” the
final model into hundreds or thousands of horizontal layers.
When the sliced file is uploaded in a 3D printer, the object
can be created layer by layer. The 3D printer reads every
slice (or 2D image) and creates the object, blending each
layer with hardly any visible sign of the layers, with as a
45. A representative claim in Digitech was: A device profile for
describing properties of a device in a digital image reproduction system to
capture, transform or render an image, said device profile comprising: first data
for describing a device dependent transformation of color information content of
the image to a device independent color space; and second data for describing a
device dependent transformation of spatial information content of the image in
said device independent color space. Digitech, 758 F.3d at 1349.
46. Brean, supra note 1, at 773-74.
47. See,
e.g.,
SHAPEWAYS,
http://www.shapeways.com/tutorials/preprint_checklist (last visited July 24, 2015) (allowing customers to upload CAD
files for printing); THINGIVERSE GROUPS, http://www.thingiverse.com/ (last
visited July 24, 2015) (website where users can download CAD files of various
designs).
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result the three dimensional object. 48

In view of this required slicing process, it appears that
CAD files arguably do not themselves constitute “instructions”
to a 3D printer. This suggests that the CAD files may not
comprise the kind of computer-readable method steps or
algorithms that are the subject of typical Beauregard claims. 49
Arguably, CAD files are more akin to mere data, which is
problematic under cases like Digitech. 50
A sliced CAD file, however, behaves more like the software
code that provides algorithms and instructions for computers
and is commonly covered by a Beauregard claim. To optimally
protect the digital object in a CAD file using a Beauregard
claim, it would seemingly be best to somehow claim the sliced
version of the CAD file rather than the native CAD file itself.
But the industry does not appear to trade in this format, so
such a requirement would be disruptive. And even if the
industry adapted so that, technologically speaking,
Beauregard claims were suitable protection for physibles, the
legal limitations discussed above may more than offset the
value of the disruption to the industry players.
* * *
The foregoing analysis shows that what would better
enhance patent protection for physibles than Beauregard
claims would be to somehow patent the CAD files per se—
untethered to a digital storage medium and not requiring that
the files be pre-sliced. This avoids both the technical and legal
limitations that prevent Beauregard claims from being more
effective, as discussed above. A discussion of the feasibility of
patenting CAD files per se follows in the next Part.
II. PATENTING CAD FILES PER SE
There are two considerable hurdles that stand in the way
of patenting CAD files per se. First is the prohibition on claims

48. 3DPrinting.com, What is 3D Printing?, http://3dprinting.com/what-is-3dprinting/ (last visited December 30, 2014).
49. Inacu & Helm, supra note 28, at 99 (“Such claims take the general form:
‘a computer usable medium having computer readable code’ or ‘a computer
readable medium storing a computer program.’”).
50. Digitech, 758 F.3d at 1349 (“Data in its ethereal, non-physical form is
simply information that does not fall under any of the categories of eligible subject
matter under section 101.”).
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directed to abstract ideas or mere data. 51 Second is the
prohibition on patenting what amounts essentially to mere
printed matter. 52 This Part explains why neither doctrine
should have absolute preclusive effect as to CAD files for 3Dprintable objects and that, in any event, strong policy concerns
favor patent protection in this context.
For purposes of the following discussion, it is proposed
that a CAD file could be claimed in Beauregard-like sui generis
fashion in the following exemplary format:
A digital representation of a physical object printable on a
3D printer, the object comprising:
element A;
element B; and
element C disposed between elements A and B.
A. CAD Files for Physibles are Not Merely Abstract Data—
They Are More Akin to Patent-Eligible “Manufactures”
As noted above, in Digitech, the Federal Circuit held that
“[d]ata in its ethereal, non-physical form is simply information
that does not fall under any of the categories of eligible subject
matter under section 101.” 53 The technology at issue in that
case involved “device profiles” that contained information
concerning color-related and spatial-related aspects of a digital
display. 54 By referencing and accounting for the information
in a device profile, the images displayed can be optimized and
displayed more clearly. 55 The claims encompassed:
A device profile for describing properties of a device in a
digital image reproduction system to capture, transform or
render an image, said device profile comprising:
first data for describing a device dependent
transformation of color information content of the image to
a device independent color space; and
second data for describing a device dependent
transformation of spatial information content of the image
in said device independent color space. 56

Having started from the premise that “[f]or all categories [of
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.

Digitech, 758 F.3d at 1349.
Gulack, 703 F.2d at 1386.
Digitech, 758 F.3d at 1350.
Id. at 1347–48.
Id.
Id. at 1349.
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patentable subject matter under Section 101] 57 except process
claims, the eligible subject matter must exist in some physical
or tangible form,” 58 the claims were deemed ineligible because
“[t]he device profile, as claimed, is a collection of intangible
color and spatial information.” 59
The Federal Circuit’s premise in Digitech is not entirely
accurate, at least not with respect to the Section 101 class of
patentable “manufactures.” The court cited to dictionary
definitions in In re Nuijten 60 (which was relied on in
Digitech), 61 stating that “manufactures” in Section 101 “refers
to ‘articles’ resulting from the process of manufacture,” and an
article is “a particular substance or commodity: as, an article of
merchandise;
an article
of
clothing;
salt
is
a
62
necessary article.”
Nothing in these definitions requires
every “manufacture” to be physical, though. And as Judge
Linn noted in dissent, the definitions relied on by the majority
in Nuijten were from an 1895 dictionary, long after the
“manufacture” language was enacted in the 1700s—language
that has remained unchanged through the present. 63 Looking
at contemporary definitions from the 1700s, the scope of
manufacture was much broader, and encompassed “any thing
made by art,” where “ ‘ art,’ in turn is defined as ‘the power of
doing something not taught by nature and instinct’; . . .
‘artfulness, skill, dexterity.’ ” 64
Accordingly, Judge Linn
concludes:
it appears that rather than delineate specific, narrow
categories, Congress has consistently intended statutory
subject matter to cover the full scope of technological
ingenuity, however it might best be claimed. Thus, “art”
and “process[es]” might be viewed, in rough terms, as the
57. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (“Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful
process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful
improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor.”).
58. Digitech, 758 F.3d at 1348.
59. Id. at 1350.
60. In re Nuijten, 500 F.3d 1346, 1351–52 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (holding that a
transitory signal with embedded data was unpatentable despite the fact that the
claimed signal caused tangible effects—essentially, encoding a discernible
“watermark” to a signal).
61. Digitech, 758 F.3d at 1350 (discussing the facts of Nuijten and holding
that “[t]he claims at issue here are even broader than the claim in Nuijten.”).
62. Nuijten, 500 F.3d at 1356.
63. Id. at 1360-61 (Linn, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
64. Id. at 1361 (Linn, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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exercise of technological skill, “manufacture[s]” and
“composition[s] of matter” as the products of that skill, and
“machine[s]” as the tools through which that skill is
exercised. 65

This sentiment is consistent with the Supreme Court’s
statement in Diamond v. Chakrabarty that “Congress intended
statutory subject matter to ‘include anything under the sun
that is made by man,’ ” 66 but is most likely overbroad in light
of subsequent Supreme Court abstractness precedent. 67
Nevertheless, a more general and moderate view from
renowned patent commentator Donald Chisum suggests that
“manufactures” need not necessarily be tangible. Chisum
explains that “manufacture” is a “catch-all” category of
patentable subject matter:
which is defined as including all man-made articles except
machines and compositions of matter. Under this view, the
only products excluded from Section 101 are products
occurring in substantially the same form naturally (not
‘made by mankind’) and so-called ‘printed matter’ (in which
the novelty and utility rest other than in the structure of
the entity). Therefore, the patentability of any man-made
structural entity should depend on the issues of other
standards of patentability such as novelty, utility, and
nonobviousness. 68

While it is fairly easy to see how mere information about a
digital screen display in Digitech might be a rare exception to
patent eligibility because the information claimed is
unconnected to something physical, a CAD file representing a
complete three-dimensional object is a far cry from such
disembodied data and can be fairly considered a “man-made
structural entity.” The law provides a more than colorable
65. Id. at 1362 (Linn, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
66. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (U.S. 1980) (quoting S. Rep.
No. 1979, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., 5 (1952); H. R. Rep. No. 1923, 82d Cong., 2d Sess.,
6 (1952)).
67. Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2354–55 (2014)
(“[W]e must distinguish between patents that claim the building blocks of human
ingenuity and those that integrate the building blocks into something more,
thereby transforming them into a patent-eligible invention. The former would
risk disproportionately tying up the use of the underlying ideas, and are therefore
ineligible for patent protection. The latter pose no comparable risk of preemption, and therefore remain eligible for the monopoly granted under our patent
laws.”).
68. 1 Donald S. Chisum, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 1.02 (2014).
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basis for printable CAD files to be treated as patent-eligible
manufactures.
Returning to the issue of abstractness, aside from the
statutory text of Section 101, the key reason to treat certain
kinds of claims as unpatentably abstract is due to concerns
about preemption. Specifically, “no one can patent . . . abstract
ideas” because “[t]hese are the basic tools of scientific and
technological work, and therefore, if patented, would stifle the
very progress that Congress is authorized to promote.” 69 The
kinds of abstract ideas that have recently been deemed
impermissibly abstract by the Supreme Court were
characterized as “fundamental economic practice[s]” and
“building block[s] of the modern economy.” 70
Patenting a CAD file drawn to a specific structural object
preempts the technological field no more than a patent on the
actual physical object itself—i.e., hardly at all. Specificallyclaimed objects are not “basic tools” but completed products, so
there is no preemption concern that should tip the scale
against finding CAD files to be non-abstract, patent-eligible
manufactures.
Compared to the cases such as Digitech and Nuijten,
which involve essentially pure data untethered to any specific
device or object, a CAD file is remarkably concrete. A CAD file
is intended to be precise, detailed, and suitable for use in
tooling and manufacturing—it is not an abstraction of an
object but an accurate representation of it.
For reasoning much like the foregoing, the International
Trade Commission recently held that “digital datasets . . .
representing the initial, intermediate, and final positions of
patients’ teeth for use in fabricating dental appliances for
orthodontic treatment of individual patients” qualified as
“articles” that could be prevented from importation if they
infringed a U.S. patent. 71 The accused data sets were created
in Pakistan, transmitted electronically to a computer in Texas,
and printed on a 3D printer to make a physical model. 72 In
69. Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 649 (2010).
70. Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2356.
71. Certain Digital Models, Inv. No. 337-TA-833, USITC (Apr. 10, 2014)
(Commission Opinion) at 34. Infringing “articles” can be excluded from entry into
the U.S. under 19 U.S.C. § 1337.
72. Certain Digital Models, Inv. No. 337-TA-833, USITC (Apr. 10, 2014)
(Commission Opinion) at 17.
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finding such data sets to be non-abstract articles, the ITC
distinguished the patient-specific set of teeth data with mere
“information in the abstract.” 73 The ITC also noted the breadth
of the statutory term “articles,” which “appears to broadly
cover infringing imports, without express limitation as to form
or type,” as well as Supreme Court precedent treating digital
files as “articles of commerce” in other contexts. 74 Ultimately,
the ITC concluded that the data sets were “true articles of
international commerce” largely on policy grounds, because
“an interpretation of ‘articles’ that allows the Commission to
reach the imported physical aligners . . . but does not include
the infringing digital data sets from which the aligners are
produced, simply because they are in digital form, is
unreasonable and inconsistent with the purpose of the
statute.” 75
To the extent there remains some question of whether,
doctrinally speaking, CAD files can be considered
“manufactures,” it should be emphasized that “[t]hese terms
[in Section 101] may not be read in a strict literal sense entirely
divorced from the context of the patent law.” 76 When Section
101 is construed in a manner mindful of the innovationencouraging purpose of patent law as a whole, designing new
products in CAD programs that represent real-world printable
objects should not be excluded from protectability at the
threshold, as discussed infra. Indeed, as the Federal Circuit
has explained, “[r]egardless of what statutory category
(‘process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter,’ 35
U.S.C. § 101) a claim’s language is crafted to literally invoke,
we look to the underlying invention for patent-eligibility
purposes.” 77 Here, the underlying invention of a printable
CAD file is the physical printed object.

73. Id. at 49–50 (discussing Bayer AG v. Housey Pharms., Inc., 340 F.3d
1367, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (holding that “knowledge that a substance possesses
a particular quality” is not an “article” under 35 U.S.C. § 271(g))
74. Id. at 38, 40–42.
75. Id. at 53–55.
76. In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1553 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (Archer, J., concurringin-part and dissenting-in-part).
77. CyberSource Corp v. Retail Decisions, Inc., 654 F.3d 1366, 1375 (Fed. Cir.
2011).
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B. CAD Files for Physibles Do Not Violate the Printed
Matter Doctrine
A CAD file is essentially a three-dimensional picture
drawn digitally and can be considered analogous to
unpatentable “printed matter.” Whether something should be
treated as printed matter turns on whether “a significant or
the sole difference between the claimed subject matter and the
prior art lies in the content of the information” in relation to
the substrate. 78
Generally, the mere arrangement of
information, symbols, or text on a substrate is simply not
considered inventive and worthy of patent protection. 79
The policy behind the printed matter doctrine is closely
related to the prohibition against abstract ideas and mere
mental steps being patented.
As Chisum explains,
“[i]ntroduction of a printed matter or symbolic element into a
claim for a patent often calls for human mental interpretation
or participation and hence brings the mental steps doctrine
into play.” 80 For this reason, the Federal Circuit noted an
exception in In re Lowry for situations where “the information
[is] processed not by the mind but by a machine, the
computer.” 81 The source code claims in Beauregard certainly
fit into this exception, as do CAD files which, by definition, are
digital files read and interpreted by a computer in order to be
understandable to humans.
C. Sound Public Policy Favors Protecting Printable
CAD Files
The current technological reality is that many designers
work largely, and sometimes entirely, in CAD programs. 82
78. 1 Donald S. Chisum, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 1.02(4) (2014).
79. In re Miller, 57 C.C.P.A. 809, 812 (C.C.P.A. 1969) (“In this instance the
claimed indicia and legend, being merely placed on the claimed structure in any
desired location and manner, do not produce the required cooperative structural
relationship necessary before the printed matter can be given patentable
weight.”); In re Russell, 18 C.C.P.A. 1184, 1185 (C.C.P.A. 1931) (“The mere
arrangement of printed matter on a sheet or sheets of paper, in book form or
otherwise,” is not patentable.).
80. 1 Donald S. Chisum, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 1.02(4)(e).
81. In re Lowry, 32 F.3d 1579, 1583 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (explaining that “[t]he
printed matter cases ‘dealt with claims defining as the invention certain novel
arrangements of printed lines or characters, useful and intelligible only to the
human mind.’ In re Bernhart, 417 F.2d 1395, 1399 (CCPA 1969)”).
82. See Brean, supra note 1, at 773-74.
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CAD files are a major madium, if not the prevailing medium,
for industrial design work and also of 3D-printing commercial
activity. 83 In order for the patent system to “promote the
Progress of . . . useful Arts,” it should reflect these realities. 84
As Judge Newman has noted, “[t]he nation has benefitted
from the adaptability of the patent system to new
technologies.” 85 To credit an invention designed and sold in the
real world but not the same invention designed and sold
digitally draws a distinction without a difference. The patent
system should not discourage innovation merely because of the
design tools utilized. As Section 103 of the Patent Act
concerning obviousness has long proscribed, “patentability
shall not be negatived by the manner in which the invention
was made.” 86
Mark Lemley recently published an article that suggests
we should not be too quick to enhance patent protection in
response to 3D printing. 87 In the article, Lemley compares
Internet piracy of copyrighted works to the piracy concerns
raised by 3D printing technology, and explores whether
enforcement of IP rights in both contexts serve their
innovation-encouraging purposes. 88 He shows that as the cost
of production and distribution of copyrightable works
decreased (with the advent of personal computers and the
Internet), counter to traditional IP theory, creativity was not
stifled but flourished. Lemley ultimately concludes that, over
time, 3D printing technology will likewise encourage
innovation in the absence of IP to the point that IP rights may
someday become unnecessary to further technological
Lemley’s analysis is thought-provoking, but
progress. 89
83. Id.
84. U.S. Const. art I., § 8., cl. 8.
85. In re Schrader, 22 F.3d 290, 297 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (Newman, J., dissenting)
(noting that this point “was recognized in Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303,
316 (1980) (“Mr. Justice Douglas reminded that the inventions most benefiting
mankind are those which ‘push back the frontiers of chemistry, physics and the
like.’”)).
86. 35 U.S.C. § 103.
87. See Mark A. Lemley, IP in a World Without Scarcity, 90 NYU L. Rev. 460
(2015).
88. Id. at 507-08 (“Incumbent industries are always threatened by new
technologies and they often turn to regulation to create barriers to those
technologies in order to protect the old way of doing thing. IP owners will do the
same thing.”).
89. Id. at 515.
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although his point might be true for music, movies, etc. and the
Internet, it would be premature to conclude that 3D printing is
anywhere near the same point or that strong utility patent
rights are no longer necessary.
Lemley first notes the Internet was originally viewed by
copyright owners as a piracy-facilitating evil that would
discourage artists and authors from creating their music,
movies, books, etc. by removing financial incentives. 90 Those
copyright owners “responded just as IP theory said they
should”:
They persuaded Congress to pass a multitude of new laws,
criminalizing copyright infringement on the Internet even
if done for no financial gain and ramping up the penalties
for copyright infringement to an extreme degree. They filed
tens of thousands of lawsuits against people who posted
copyrighted content online. They sued anyone with even a
vague connection to the pirates . . . . 91

These aggressive enforcement efforts were ineffective.92
Copyright infringement on the Internet is still rampant, and
yet the amount of new artistic content being created is higher
than ever. 93 A lot of quality content is even generated for the
purpose of giving it away for free over the Internet. 94
Lemley attributes the phenomenon of mass creative
activity in the face of minimal or no underlying IP incentives
to several factors, including: (1) that the ease of copying and
distributing content over the Internet facilitates legitimate
reproduction and distribution every bit as much as it does
piracy, lowering and even eliminating barriers to entry on the
publishing end; (2) that the technology needed for generating
quality music and movies at home emerged along with the
Internet and lowered production costs considerably; and (3)
that the presence of people using these tools to create inspires

90. Id. at 482-83 (“Consistent with IP theory, as the cost of reproduction and
distribution dropped to zero, piracy became rampant on the Internet. The
companies that produced content in the pre-Internet world worried that they
could not make money in an environment where copying was so easy.”).
91. Id. at 483.
92. Id. at 484.
93. Id. at 485. Lemley notes that “economic scholarship suggests” the new
music is “at least as high quality as before the Internet.” Id. at 485. The relative
quality of music is obviously highly subjective.
94. Id. at 487.
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creativity by others. 95 And, more fundamentally, Lemley
posits that “it may simply be that IP theory is wrong about
what motivates people to create.” 96 Inspiration, competition,
problem-solving, attribution, and recognition have been shown
to be at least as motivating, and in many cases more
motivating, than money. 97
Lemley concedes that some kinds of creative works cannot
flourish in the absence of IP rights—namely, big budget movies
and video games, where the cost of creation remains very high
and thus it is more important to be able to recoup one’s
investment. 98 A nuanced balancing act is therefore required to
ensure that the law “protect[s] those exceptional works without
blocking the creativity that is happening despite, not because
of, IP.” 99 The problem is that trying to target the facilitators of
harmful infringement (e.g., shutting down peer-to-peer file
sharing services) carries the risk of “killing off what is good
about the Internet” in the process. 100
According to Lemley, 3D printing will likely endure the
same trials and face the same challenges.
Initially,
“[p]rofessional industrial design firms will resist having their
works ‘Napsterized’ because they fear losing control over who
can use their design and not getting paid when people do.” 101 I
agree with Lemley that the solution to those design firms’
legitimate concerns is certainly not to shut down or overly
regulate the sale of 3D printers because the “social value in [3D
printing] technolog[y], like the Internet, is enormous.” 102 Like
the Internet, 3D printing technology will reduce production
and distribution costs in manufacturing like never before, and
will in turn give rise to a new generation of designers and
manufacturers that, while disruptive to industries, will be for
the good of the society in the form of better, cheaper, and/or
more environmentally-friendly products. 103
But we are not there yet. While laptops and the Internet
95. Lemley, supra note 87, at 487-95.
96. Id. at 493.
97. Id. at 463, 493.
98. Id. at 496.
99. Id. at 496.
100. Id. at 462, 500.
101. Lemley, supra note 87, at 498.
102. Id. at 500-01. The advent of 3D-printed guns, for example, have caught
the attention of lawmakers. Id. at 500.
103. Id. at 58–59.
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allowed anybody with a guitar to record and distribute
copyrightable songs on an unprecedented scale, productive use
of 3D printing technology outside of the industrial
manufacturing context is in its infancy and likely will be for a
while. 104 Most people can learn to play a song on a guitar in a
time that is de minimis compared to the time needed to learn
to use a CAD program to design a patentable utilitarian device.
The amount of specialized knowledge, research, and
development involved in designing a new engine part,
consumer electronic, or robot, for example, tends to be quite
substantial. And these examples are not on par with the bigbudget movie and video game “exceptions” noted by Lemley
where IP rights are still vital for copyrightable works 105—they
represent typical subject matter for utility patents. Indeed, in
2013 the top fifty recipients of utility patents in the United
States were almost exclusively household-name consumer
electronics, software, automotive, and telecommunications
companies. 106 To the extent 3D printing brings engineering
and product design to the masses, it is not likely to be
patentable utilitarian engineering on a large scale any time
soon. Inventions are not patentable unless useful, novel, and
nonobvious, 107 whereas all that is required for copyrightability
is originality—a very low threshold requiring only a modicum
of investment. 108
Lemley ultimately suggests that “[i]t may be that we
simply do not need IP protection when both the cost of creation
and the cost of distribution fall below a certain point.” 109 While
in the copyright context I am inclined to agree that “creation
that relies on IP is likely to play a less and less significant role
in a post-scarcity world,” 110 the realm of utility patent subject
104. See Brean, supra note 1, at 774-81.
105. Lemley, supra note 87, at 506.
106. See USPTO, Patenting By Organizations (Utility Patents), Part B1-1–B12 (2013), available at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/topo
_13.pdf. The top ten companies were, in order, IBM, Samsung, Canon, Sony,
Microsoft, Panasonic, Toshiba, Qualcomm, LG, and Google. Id.
107. 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-103.
108. 17 U.S.C. § 102; Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340,
345 (1991) (“To be sure, the requisite level of creativity is extremely low; even a
slight amount will suffice. The vast majority of works make the grade quite easily,
as they possess some creative spark, ‘no matter how crude, humble or obvious’ it
might be.”).
109. Lemley, supra note 87, at 50.
110. Lemley, supra note 87 at 48. The reference to “post-scarcity” refers to a
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matter in many technology sectors is still well above the cost
threshold where the value of IP might diminish. 111 The
distribution costs may fall across most sectors thanks to 3D
printing, but the cost of creation may differ considerably
depending on the technology. Robotics, for example, might see
a tremendous reduction in the cost of development and
prototyping, while consumer electronics probably will not. The
same is true for artistic works—as Lemley notes, while music
recording is cheaper than ever, the cost of creating big-budget
movies may never decrease even though the distribution cost
is much smaller now due to the Internet. 112
The day may come when the tools needed to create and
distribute most 3D-printable inventions are so sophisticated
and user-friendly that amateurs will easily and routinely
create patentable innovations across many industries. 113 But
that day does not appear to even be on the horizon at this point
in time, and the prospect does not warrant declining to protect
the related IP now, while we could be fanning the flames of this
emerging technology with appropriate patent protection.
Indeed, maintaining meaningful patent protection after
crossing a new technological frontier is exactly what Judge
Newman had in mind when praising the adaptability and
success of the patent system. 114
On the other hand, Lemley concludes that, based on the
lessons we can learn from the copyright content industry’s
response to the Internet, “we should resist the tendency to
expand IP reflexively to meet every new technological
challenge.” 115 This is a sound principle, but perhaps one with
broader applicability to artistic, rather than technological,
world where goods are all dig,ital or traded as disembodied information. As
Lemley explains, the advent of the Internet and 3D printing has made it sko that
“[e]xisting content is no longer scarce. Once created, it costs virtually nothing to
reproduce, and anyone can copy and distribute it.” Id. at 12.
111. Id. at 50–51.
112. Id. at 506.
113. Id. at 487-89.
114. Judge Newman’s above quotation referenced Diamond v. Chakrabarty,
447 U.S. 303 (1980). See supra note 65. Had the Court in Chakrabarty decided
not to deem genetically-engineered bacteria patent-eligible, arguably that entire
industry would have collapsed from lack of up-front investment.
115. Lemley, supra note 87, at 52 (“Incumbent industries are always
threatened by new technologies and they often turn to regulation to create
barriers to those technologies in order to protect the old way of doing thing. IP
owners will do the same thing.”).
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innovation. Working on cutting-edge technology to push
technological boundaries often requires utilizing the most
current tools and state-of-the-art equipment. This tends to
require a substantial up-front investment that might not
happen as often absent the monetary incentives IP can
provide. Put another way, being too far behind on our IP laws
might lead to technological complacency that stalls innovation.
Some will continue to rely on older tools to innovate, but most
technological innovation does not come from using outdated
tools. Maintaining strong IP rights for inventions made using
the newest tools promotes technological progress by
encouraging adoption of, and improvement upon, the latest
technologies.
Patenting physibles will allow inventions to be protected
to the same extent, in substance, regardless of whether the
inventive and distributive medium is physical or digital. To
the extent IP protection for physical utilitarian objects remains
valuable for encouraging technological innovation (and I
believe it does), the same is true for physibles. But there is a
gap in the law that precludes protecting these two versions of
the same thing with the same scope of protection. This gap
should be closed just like other areas where the form of patent
claims tends to be exalted over the claims’ substance. 116
Even the Supreme Court’s recent Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank
case, which took a broad view of unpatentably abstract
computerized inventions, treats claims on their substantive
merit rather than their style, and considered method, system,
and computer-readable medium claims all to be directed to
essentially the same invention. 117 Alice would therefore
support the treatment of physical product and corresponding
CAD claims as both equally eligible for patent protection.
1. Safe Harbor for Incidental Infringers
Protecting CAD files against unauthorized sales over the
Internet is in keeping with, and essentially co-extensive with,
patent protection for product claims as asserted against
traditional manufacturers. Admittedly, however, patenting
116. See, e.g., Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2357
(2014) (“A claim that recites an abstract idea must include ‘additional features’
to ensure ‘that the [claim] is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize
the [abstract idea].’ ” ).
117. Id. at 2360.
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CAD files for physibles will allow for some modest incidental
infringement to be actionable that is currently immunized. For
example, one who merely downloads or makes available for
download a CAD file would arguably be infringing a CAD-file
claim by “making” the patented invention, but would not
infringe a physical product claim. To the extent this occurs
over a peer-to-peer network or on a CAD file sharing service
such as Thingiverse, 118 widespread enforcement against endusers, peer-to-peer software providers, or proprietors of usergenerated online CAD file repositories risks “killing off” what
is good about 3D printing in the process. 119
Enforcement against end-users who merely download a
CAD file (or possess it and make it available via a peer-to-peer
network) is highly unlikely because such de minimis
infringement, while actionable, results in little to no
recoverable damages or other remedies that would make
enforcement worthwhile. 120 Should those end-users proceed to
“use” the CAD file to make and sell a similar competing CAD
file, a more legitimate claim of infringement can be made. 121
The trickier issues surround peer-to-peer network
providers and user-generated CAD file repositories because
direct infringement is a strict liability tort, and there is no safe
harbor for unknowingly infringing. 122 To some extent this
concern is offset again by the likelihood that much of the
infringement will be de minimis (e.g., a single “making” when
the CAD file is stored on a server) and lead to nominal
damages, if any. But injunctive relief—having the file
removed—is often going to be much more desirable to
patentees in this situation anyway. For peer-to-peer network
providers, the problem is a non-issue because merely providing
software that can be used for sharing CAD files would not
118. THINGIVERSE GROUPS , www.thingiverse.com (last visited July 25,
2015).
119. Lemley, supra note 87,. at 3, 41–42.
120. Embrex, Inc. v. Serv. Eng’g Corp., 216 F.3d 1343, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2000)
(Rader, J., concurring) (“[T]he statute leaves no leeway to excuse infringement
because the infringer only infringed a little. Rather, the statute accommodates
concerns about de minimis infringement in damages calculations.”).
121. See NTP, Inc. v. Research In Motion, Ltd., 418 F.3d 1282, 1317 (Fed. Cir.
2005) (explaining that the “use” of an invention occurs when it is “put into
service”)
122. See Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 131 S. Ct. 2060, 2065 n.2
(2011).
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constitute direct infringement under Section 271(a). 123
Perhaps a claim can be made for active inducement or
contributory infringement, but such claims are rarely
appropriate due to the requirement that the indirect infringer
possess specific intent to cause infringement (which makes
such theories undesirable to patentees anyway).
Nonetheless, it should be noted that indirect infringement
claims can be made against peer-to-peer networks, user
repositories, and individual users now, in the absence of CAD
file patent protection, and thus provide a valuable tool for
combating infringement with respect to the more egregious
and obviously intentional indirect infringement (a la Napster).
Those who merely host or transmit CAD files representing
patented objects, without knowing that the files are infringing,
however, should be immunized from indirect infringement
liability whether the CAD files are parented per se or not. For
the same reason, those who inadvertently designed a CAD file
similar to a patented object (or CAD file) would not be liable
for indirect infringement either.
For the user-generated CAD file repositories like
Thingiverse, in addition to the foregoing, another marketbased solution is available—make contributors assume the
risk and responsibility for their CAD files, including any
intellectual property infringement, and reserve the right to
Similar contractual
remove any infringing content. 124
protections are in place for incidental infringers already, such
as when retailers and re-sellers, who would otherwise be
responsible for infringement, insist on indemnity from their
respective manufacturers and product suppliers. 125
Finally, should the above limitations on incidental
infringement liability prove to be inadequate in deterring
harmful litigious patentees, it would be advisable to adopt a
statutory safe harbor for those who merely host or relay CAD
123. See NTP, Inc. v. Research In Motion, Ltd., 418 F.3d 1282, 1317 (Fed. Cir.
2005) (explaining that the “use” of an invention occurs when it is “put into
service”); MGM Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 932 (2005)
(explaining that peer-to-peer programs do not directly infringe per se because
they have legitimate non-infringing uses).
124. THINGIVERSE GROUPS,
http://www.thingiverse.com/legal (last
visited July 24, 2015).
125. See, e.g., Speedtrack, Inc. v. Office Depot, Inc., 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS
11169 (Fed. Cir. June 30, 2015) (case involving various online retailers that had
been indemnified by their software vendor)

2015]

3D PRINTING & PATENTING PHYSIBLES

863

files, much like was implemented with the Digital Millennium
Copyright Act (“DMCA”). In the closely analogous context of
distributing copyrighted content on the Internet, the DMCA
provides that the passive transmission or routing of
copyrighted material by an online service provider, as well as
the storage of such material at the direction of a user, is not
actionable if the service provider lacks knowledge of the
infringing nature of the material and agrees to take down the
content upon receiving a valid notice from the copyright
owner. 126 Similar protections are equally sensible in the
patented CAD file context to avoid the potential for harmful
incidental infringement assertions. 127
CONCLUSION
Designers of 3D-printable products are currently at a
disadvantage concerning the enforceability of patent rights in
their inventions. To combat infringement, it is necessary to
have an effective way to extinguish infringement at the
source—in this case, where the CAD files are being sold or
distributed. The law does not currently provide such designers
with patent protection allowing for adequate remedies against
such entities. This discourages innovation in the emerging 3Dprinting space. Absent a way to patent the printable CAD files
per se, the enforceability against 3D-printing infringement will
remain severely limited.
Beauregard claims are perhaps the best existing option for
patents that might encompass CAD files, but even Beauregard
claims cannot overcome many of the legal and technical
limitations on protection. At best, Beauregard claims might
provide some small additional scope of enforceability that still
126. 17 U.S.C. § 512(a), (c).
127. In fact, although outside the scope of this paper, at least some expressive
and non-utilitarian portions of a CAD file may already be protectable under
copyright and subject to the DMCA, thus making it a useful additional layer of
protection for patentees to consider. Only actual copying of such non-utilitarian
features within the CAD file (e.g., stylistic choices and original designs), and not
coincidental similarity, would be actionable under copyright, but such protection
is still useful against blatant copying done without any effort to change the file
or “design around” it. For a further discussion of the potential use of copyright
for protecting CAD files, see my prior article. Brean, supra note 1, at 807-813
(explaining that copyright protection may be feasible for CAD files, but that
important limitations may render the protection useful only “to the extent that
the value of a product stems from its form, not from its function”).

864

3D PRINTING & PATENTING PHYSIBLES [Vol:55

does not come close to putting 3D-printable inventions on the
same footing with other kinds of inventions.
But it should be remembered that Beauregard was a “test
case.” Beauregard changed the law because IBM pushed for
broader protection with a form of claiming that the law did not
currently recognize, and the USPTO was ultimately convinced
to change its policy to allow such claiming. That policy shift
considerably expanded the scope of protection available for
software.
A similar test case for CAD files using a claim of the form
proposed herein could have the same effect. But whether
through a USPTO policy shift, a doctrinal development in the
courts, or a statutory amendment, the future of patent
protection for 3D-printable products hinges on stakeholders
pushing for patent claims that are commensurate in scope with
their inventions. 3D printing is the next big step into the
digital millennium, and the patent system should jettison the
obsolete notion that all product inventions are physical.

